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I. INTRODUCTION
Global development diminishes the voices of indigenous
populations around the world. Resource extraction and commercial use
threaten even the most isolated groups.1 In an effort to develop enforceable
rights for indigenous peoples, the United Nations Declaration of the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples sought to protect indigenous peoples through the
principle of the Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (“FPIC”). This paper
focuses on why the FPIC is struggling to take hold in the international
community.
*

Juris Doctor and Master’s in Public Administration Candidate 2021,
Alexander Blewett III School of Law at the University of Montana.
1.
S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 4
(1996).
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To effectively execute the FPIC, this principle should become
hard law because countries view hard law as binding. Because most
nations in the international community view the FPIC as soft law,2 this
principle has failed to adequately protect indigenous peoples’ rights.
The international community and the United Nations (“UN”) have
long recognized general human rights as an obligation of each nation state.
Finally, in 2007, the UN articulated additional rights specifically for
indigenous peoples through the FPIC.3 The UN developed the FPIC by
using key terms and theories from the 1989 International Labour
Convention No. 169 (“ILO 169”), known as the Indigenous and Tribal
Peoples Convention.4 The ILO 169’s members sought to protect two main
groups of people:
(1) Tribal peoples in independent countries whose social,
cultural and economic conditions distinguish them from
other sections of the national community, and whose
status is regulated wholly or partially by their own
customs or traditions or by special laws or regulations;
and (2) peoples in independent countries who are
regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from
the populations which inhabited the country, or a
geographical region to which the country belongs, at the
time of conquest or colonization or the establishment of
present state boundaries and who, irrespective of their
legal status, retain some or all of their own social,
economic, cultural and political institutions.5
While each of the 20 countries that ratified the ILO define “indigenous”
differently,6 the ILO 169 sought to unite the countries’ governments to
implement a common goal: “To ensure indigenous people’s fundamental
rights and work together with indigenous communities to end
discrimination both as it relates to inequalities in outcomes – differences

2.
TSEMING YANG ET AL., COMPARATIVE AND GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY ch. 2, 60 (2019) (explaining soft law is a norm
that is not “quite law,” while hard law is generally accepted as law).
3.
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,
G.A. Res. 61/295, at 1, U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., 107th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc.
A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007) [hereinafter UNDRIP].
4.
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, INDIGENOUS AND TRIBAL
PEOPLES’ RIGHTS IN PRACTICE: A GUIDE TO ILO CONVENTION NO. 169, 5 (2009).
5.
Id. at 9.
6.
Id. at 10–23.
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in health, education, employment, etc. – and as it relates to inequalities in
the processes of governance – participation and involvement of
indigenous peoples in decision-making, government institutions and
programs.”7 In 2007, the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples (“UNDRIP”) acknowledged the importance of ILO
169, and articulated the need for appropriate implementation
mechanisms.8 UNDRIP’s members drafted a series of articles, which now
form the FPIC.9
UNDRIP, unlike the ILO 169, is not a legally binding document
but rather a stated commitment to certain values that may become law.10
The FPIC’s articulation contained within UNDRIP “is still in a phase of
dynamic development and the scope of the standard is not yet fully
clarified.”11 Indigenous populations have experienced more than just
shortfalls in the effectiveness of this principle. Across the globe, countries
that have signed onto this principle have continued to commit atrocities
against indigenous populations, especially when it comes to natural
resource development.
For example, 2009 marked a violent time for Peru’s indigenous
peoples.12 In response to their political activism, the Peruvian government
classified indigenous peoples in the country as “extremists.”13 The biggest
driver of the FPIC’s ineffectiveness is national governments teaming up
with global corporations, as seen in Peru, because of the belief that
corporations are not bound to the FPIC, and therefore, countries do not
enforce FPIC requirements.14 If the international community viewed the
7.
Id. at 29. (emphasis in the original).
8.
Id. at 30.
9.
UNDRIP, supra note 3, at arts. 10, 11, 19, 28, 39. (referencing art. 10
which states Indigenous peoples shall not be forced from their homes; (2) art. 11 § 2
which states nations will provide restitution if property is taken without FPIC; (3) art.
19 which states nations will consult and cooperate in good faith with Indigenous
peoples; (4) art. 28 which states indigenous peoples have the right to redress, by means
that can include restitution or equitable compensation for land or resources the
government took without FPIC; and (5) art. 29 § 2 which states nations cannot store
hazardous chemicals on Indigenous lands without FPIC).
10.
Ipshita Chaturvedi, A Critical Study of Free, Prior and Informed
Consent in the Context of the Right to Development — Can “Consent” be Withheld?,
5 J. INDIAN L. & SOC’Y 37, 40 (2014).
11.
S.J. OMBOUTS, HAVING A SAY: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND FREE, PRIOR AND INFORMED CONSENT, 20 (2014).
12.
Elizabeth Salmón G., The Struggle for Laws of Free, Prior, and
Informed Consultation in Peru: Lessons and Ambiguities in the Recognition of
Indigenous Peoples, 22 P. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 353 (2013).
13.
Id. at 355.
14.
Id.
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FPIC like the duty to not harm or right to home and property, principles
now considered hard law, other nation states could pressure breaching
countries to follow the FPIC.
In Part I, this paper will illustrate the background of the FPIC and
the rights of indigenous populations globally. Part II will address the
pitfalls of the FPIC and give examples of states’ domestic laws failing to
enforce the FPIC. Part III will provide how international law can move
toward adopting the FPIC as “hard law” by analyzing the history of the
“duty not to harm” and “right to home and property,” which are hard laws.
Finally, Part IV will explore how the FPIC may already be embedded in
customary hard law through cultural heritage protections.

II. EVOLUTION OF THE FREE, PRIOR, AND
INFORMED CONSENT PRINCIPLE
Although the United Nations did not introduce the FPIC to
international actors until 2007,15 the global community began discussing
indigenous rights in the 1970s.16 “Generic protection” of indigenous
groups is explained in Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights17 and asserts, “In those [s]tates in which ethnic,
religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such
minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other
members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice
their own religion, or to use their own language.”18 As concerns around
indigenous rights grew, the International Labour Organisation, a
specialized branch of the UN that focuses on workers’ rights, became
involved.19
In 1957, the first legal document, the International Labour
Organisation’s Convention No. 107 (“ILO 107”), was specifically created
around indigenous rights.20 ILO 107 focused on governmental
responsibility in integrating indigenous populations into the majority
populations.21 Indigenous communities criticized ILO 107 as
15.
UNDRIP, supra note 3.
16.
ANAYA, supra note 1, at 50.
17.
ROMBOUTS, supra note 10, at 12.
18.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, General
Assembly, Mar. 23, 1976, Art. 49 I.L.M 2200A (XXI).
19.
BEN SAUL, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND HUMAN RIGHTS 27 (2016);
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, State of the World’s
Indigenous Peoples (UN, 2009), 2.
20.
ROMBOUTS, supra note 10, at 13.
21.
ROMBOUTS, supra note 10, at 13; Convention on International Labour
Organisation, Jun. 26, 1957, 107 ILO.
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“paternalistic” and “promoting assimilation.”22 As views and politics
shifted, influenced by the Human Rights Conventions of 1966 and
indigenous voices, the ILO began re-evaluating its integration policy
under ILO 107.23 The International Labour Organisation reconvened in
1989 and passed ILO 169.24 ILO 169 implemented tribal consultation,
implied semi-autonomous societies, and allowed self-identification of
status or relation to an indigenous population.25 Despite colonization
having a deep and lasting impact on many countries, only 11 percent
signed ILO 169, a decrease from ILO 107, which had less stringent
restrictions.26 Of the countries that signed, the majority were from Latin
America, with four in Europe, one in Africa, one in Asia, and one from the
Pacific.27
Recognizing the need to protect indigenous rights, the United
Nations struggled to adopt its own declaration that paralleled the
achievements of ILO 169.28 In 1982, the United Nations formed the
Working Group on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (“WGIP”) to prepare
a draft declaration.29 In 1985, the WGIP created a declaration that included
indigenous voices as well as research to “deepen the understanding of the
issues involved.”30 The WGIP completed a draft declaration in August
1993 and gave it to the Commission on Human Rights seeking support.31
While a working group within the Commission on Human Rights planned
on meeting every year for over ten years, the declaration failed to gain
support from countries.32 The Commission on Human Rights failed to
adopt the declaration from 1994 to 2006, but in June of 2006, the Human
Rights Council (“HRC”) adopted the declaration and sought support from

22.
SAUL, supra note 19, at 28.
23.
ROMBOUTS, supra note 10, at 13–14.
24.
Id. at 13.
25.
SAUL, supra note 19, at 28–29.
26.
Id. at 30.
27.
Id.
28.
Karen Engle, On Fragile Architecture: The UN Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples in The Context of Human Rights, 22 EUR. J. INT. L. 141,
143 (2011).
29.
Id.
30.
ASBJØRN EIDE, The Indigenous Peoples, the Working Group on
Indigenous Populations and the Adoption of the UN Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, in ASBJØRN EIDE ET AL., MAKING THE DECLARATION WORK: THE
UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 32, 37 (Claire
Chartres & Rodolfo Stavenhagen eds., 2009) [hereinafter Making the Declaration Work].
31.
Id. at 38. The Commission on Human Rights sets standards to govern
human rights issues.
32.
Id.
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the UN General Assembly.33 Despite ample support in the HRC, five
major member countries of the UN General Assembly opposed the
declaration’s adoption: Canada, Australia, New Zealand, United States,
and Russia.34
One of the main criticisms was Article 19, which stated
indigenous groups must consent to projects.35 These five opponents
influenced a majority of African countries to vote against the declaration,
which failed in the UN General Assembly in November 2006.36 Yet, after
further negotiations led to nine small changes in the HRC’s draft, the
African countries that had previously opposed the draft shifted to
supporting the declaration.37 In September 2007, the UN General
Assembly passed the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People,
creating the FPIC.38
Executing the FPIC has been “slow and uneven by countries,
private sector corporations, non-governmental organizations, international
financial institutions, and the United Nations agencies.”39 With difficulties
facing the FPIC’s effectiveness, the UN Food and Agriculture (“FAO”)
branch created a six-step process to implement the FPIC for companies
looking to develop in known indigenous areas.40
(1)

Identify the indigenous groups and their
representatives.41 Information on indigenous peoples
may be accessed through resources such as non-profit

33.
Id. at 38 (showing that the United States, Canada, New Zealand, and
Australia were not signatories during this vote. Later, all four countries voiced support
for UNDRIP, including the United States in 2010.); see also
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, at
1, U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., 107th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13,
2007).
34.
Making the Declaration Work, supra note 30, at 39.
35.
Id. at 40.
36.
Id. at 38–39.
37.
Id. at 42 (stating most of these changes were “small and
inconsequential[;]” however, in one larger change, the drafters changed the right to
self-determination to include “respect for political unity of the state.” The implication
of this is still not known, but this change was one of the reasons for the reluctant
African countries to sign on.).
38.
Id. at 41–42.
39.
Free Prior and Informed Consent: An Indigenous peoples’ right and
a good practice for local communities, FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF
THE UNITED NATIONS, 19−30 (2016), http://www.fao.org/3/a-i6190e.pdf [hereinafter
FAO].
40.
Id. at 19.
41.
Id. at 20.
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organizations, official national censuses and
community-based organizations.42 Step one also
encourages entities to identify any mobile
communities, research any local laws pertaining to the
FPIC, and approach any indigenous community
through their self-governance structure.43
(2) Identify the geography and demographic information
of the proposed development area.44 Identification
happens through “participatory mapping,” which
means involving indigenous community members to
better “understand connections between people,
places and organizations over space and/or time.”45
This step encourages participation through all
affected communities as well as placing
responsibility on the project owners to determine who
owns the proposed land and if there is non-negotiable
land.46
(3) Design a communication plan to disseminate project
information in a transparent way.47 Project
developers are encouraged to perform this step
through meeting with indigenous peoples when and
where they want to, conveying their right to say no,
and documenting proceedings by providing copies to
all parties.48
(4) Gain consent.49 All parties must reach an agreement,
have documents involved in the process readily
available in the appropriate languages, identify any
possible risks, indicate which parts of the agreement
42.
Id.
43.
Id. at 20–21.
44.
Id. at 21.
45.
Id. 19−30 (quoting National Co-ordinating Centre for Public
Engagement,
How
to
Perform
Participatory
Mapping
(2017),
https://www.publicengagement.ac.uk/sites/default/files/
publication/how_to_perform_participatory_mapping.pdf).
46.
Id. at 22–23 (explaining non-negotiable land includes sacred sites,
burial areas, etc.).
47.
Id. at 23.
48.
Id. at 23–24.
49.
Id. at 25.
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the indigenous peoples have not consented to, and
establish conditions on what may lead to their
consent.50 An agreement should include parties,
summary of project, substantive evidence of consent,
feedback and complaints mechanism, monitoring
plan, and terms for withdrawal of consent.51
(5) Monitor and evaluate aspects of the agreement.52 This
step works to ensure participation from the impacted
community and gives indigenous groups the ability to
raise concerns.53
(6) Document the lessons learned to help with future
development goals.54
These six steps outline one method to FAO’s approach on the
FPIC, however, the FAO’s approach still has shortcomings.55 The FPIC’s
duties involve duty to consult, participation, and consent have continued
to be a significant problem due to diminished support, through lack of
implementation and resources, from local or national governments.56
Additionally, the FAO guidelines do not address appropriate action if an
indigenous community does not consent to a project. In contrast, the
International Council on Mining and Metals (“ICMM”) has a policy that
“requires members to seek consent, but does not require members to gain
consent,” similar to the United States’ and Canada’s rules, before
initiating a project.57 Finally, companies may also fail to gain consent,
and governments can step in and approve development regardless.58 In
order to effectuate the FPIC, the participating nations need to address
these failures.

50.
Id.
51.
Id. at 26.
52.
Id. at 29.
53.
Id.
54.
Id. at 30.
55.
Id. at 19−30.
56.
ROMBOUTS, supra note 10, at 94.
57.
ANGELA ANTAKLY ET AL., INDIGENOUS RIGHTS IN SOUTH AMERICA
15−16 (Juan Sonoda ed., 2016).
58.
Id. at 16.
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III. THE FPIC AND ITS FAILURE TO HELP INDIGENOUS POPULATIONS
Despite the FPIC going into effect over ten years ago, companies
and nations still commit atrocities against indigenous populations.59 In
2018, there were 164 documented killings of individuals trying to protect
their land.60 Latin America has the highest rate of violence against
activists, with little government protection, as well as suffering from
international companies extracting resources on indigenous land.61 This
data leads to some key concerns about the FPIC among the international
community, including implementation and lack of enforcement.
A. Lack of Clarity in Implementation
Fundamental issues remain with implementing the FPIC including
isolation, internal participation, and overlap.62 Isolation is detrimental to
the FPIC’s goals because some indigenous populations desire to live
secluded.63 Because of their isolation, public participation and
consultation are difficult.64 Scholars argue the “desire to be left alone”
shows they do not give consent to projects because of their intention to
secure their land from the outside communities.65
This reluctance and mistrust lend itself to difficulties when
implementing the FPIC. Another issue with the FPIC implementation is
internal participation.66 Some indigenous groups contain marginalized
populations like women and children, but do not allow all community
members to participate—a concept the FPIC requires.67 For example, in
some indigenous groups, women and children are not consulted on issues
that affect the internal community.68 Because overall participation by

59.
Enemies of the State? How governments and businesses silence land
and environmental defenders, GLOBAL WITNESS 8 (July 2019), https://www.
globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/environmental-activists/enemies-state/ [hereinafter
Global Witness].
60.
Id.
61.
Id. at 9.
62.
ROMBOUTS, supra note 10, at 173−83.
63.
Id. at 174.
64.
Id. at 175.
65.
Id. at 174.
66.
Id. at 177.
67.
Id. at 179.
68.
Id. at 177−78 (explaining the Western world’s ideas behind effective
participation must be handled delicately with indigenous populations that have a
different framework of society).
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affected indigenous groups is a key part of the FPIC implementation,
participation from “illiberal” communities is challenging.69
A third major issue with implementation is overlap between other
indigenous communities or entities.70 A “dichotomized” view of
indigenous groups leads to “arbitrarily fixating indigenous peoples’
consensus, while disregarding the multiple and fragmented nature of the
member subject positions.”71 By recognizing the cultural overlaps and
differing interests among groups, developers face challenges to achieve
one common plan and gain all groups’ consent.72
Another key issue involves private actors like the World Bank and
extractive resource industries’ interpretation of the FPIC. 73 Because
UNDRIP applies to governments and not private companies,74 the World
Bank has implemented less stringent guidelines called Free, Prior, and
Informed Consultation, except for in special circumstances where it
advises use of the FPIC.75 As noted, the ICMM has an even lesser standard,
which directs that development programs should engage and consult with
indigenous peoples in a “fair, timely and culturally appropriate way
throughout the project cycle.”76 This standard could “lead to breaches of
international human rights standards, as companies might only do the
minimum necessary to meet the requirements of local legislation,
potentially failing to recognize the right to the FPIC, and thus infringing
[on] the Indigenous right to self-determination.”77 While the ICMM is
69.
Id. at 177−79 (defining illiberal as “communities that internally do
not adhere to internationally established human rights norms in relation to
participation of marginalized groups living in these communities”).
70.
Id. at 179–83.
71.
Id. at 181 (citing Right Based Approach to Development: Exploring
the Potential and Pitfalls, 71 (Sam Hickey & Diana Mitlin eds., 2009)).
72.
Id. at 182–83.
73.
Philippe Hanna & Frank Vanclay, Human rights, Indigenous peoples
and the concept of Free, Prior and Informed Consent, Impact Assessment and Project
Appraisal, 31 HUMAN RIGHTS AND IMPACT ASSESSMENT 146, 151 (2013).
74.
ANTAKLY, supra note 57, at 11.
75.
HANNA, supra note 73, at 151 (stating special circumstances include
“Impacts on Lands and Natural Resources Subject to Traditional Ownership or Under
Customary Use,” “Relocation of Indigenous Peoples from Lands and Natural
Resources Subject to Traditional Ownership or Under Customary Use” and for
projects that impact “Critical Cultural Heritage”).
76.
Id.
77.
Id. (citing Bethany Haalboom, The Intersection of Corporate Social
Responsibility Guidelines and Indigenous Rights: Examining Neoliberal Governance
of a Proposed Mining Project in Suriname 43, GEOFORUM 2012, at 969–79,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2012.06.003);
see
also
Environmental
Assessment: Dakota Access Pipeline Project 2 (2016) (stating the Standing Rock
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taking steps to follow the FPIC, ultimately, it can still decide to move
forward with projects, even if there is opposition or a lack of consensus.78
Finally, it remains unclear if the “consent” part of the FPIC
includes veto power.79 Without veto power, the FPIC loses strength
because projects can continue to move forward. As of now, the
international community recognizes tribal consultation as the customary
norm.80 For instance, the United States has a “long-standing executive
branch policy to incorporate special [tribal] status into regulatory
processes,” but it does not include tribal veto power on projects.81
Similarly, Canada has a duty to consult with indigenous communities
during the Environmental Impact Assessment phase which includes
“good-faith consultation” and willingness to make changes based on
information obtained during assessments.82 Canada’s policy, however,
does not include tribal consultation as determinative of whether the project
moves forward, even if indigenous communities are opposed.83
Unfortunately, as shown in Canada’s and the United States’ policies, the
question of whether nation states need to obtain consent from indigenous
communities is usually answered in the negative because governments can
weigh economic benefit to regulate resources for all citizens, not just its
indigenous groups.84
B. Lack of Enforcement
Along with implementation issues, the FPIC faces a lack of
enforcement in countries that have adopted it, which non-compliant
countries would have to resolve if the FPIC was considered hard law.
Some of the biggest breaches of the FPIC stem primarily from Latin
American countries,85 even though Latin American countries comprise the

Sioux Tribe opposed a pipeline development from crossing a waterbody upstream
from their water takes, and the Tribe argued they were not adequately consulted on
the project despite the project moving forward).
78.
ANTAKLY, supra note 57, at 16.
79.
CHATURVEDI, supra note 11, at 52.
80.
YANG, supra note 2, at 571.
81.
Id.
82.
Id. at 573.
83.
Id.
84.
CHATURVEDI, supra note 11, at 53; see also Mauro Barelli, Free,
Prior and Informed Consent in the Aftermath of the UN Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples: Developments and Challenges Ahead, 16 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 1,
5 (2012).
85.
Global Witness, supra note 59, at 9.

252

PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW

Vol. 44

majority of countries that signed ILO 169.86 This issue is referred to as the
“governance gap,” which means a nation state fails to protect populations
because of lack of mechanisms to ensure compliance.87 Additionally, there
is no legal entity or instrument to enforce compliance because UNDRIP is
nonbinding unless it is carried out in domestic law.88
Further, a government’s right to develop and the FPIC often
conflict, particularly in developing countries.89 State versus tribal
sovereignty and ownership of national resources are often still debated.90
Because nation states argue these resources “are the benefit for all,” courts
often side with nations on ownership issues.91
Issues over rights to develop and resource ownership are further
conflated due to large inconsistencies between an international, national,
and domestic regulation, known as the “implementation gap.”92 The
Philippines exemplifies the implementation gap in a conflict with Dole
Asia, one of the largest producers of bananas, which is backed by
companies like JP Morgan Chase.93 The Philippines is a signatory to
UNDRIP,94 and it also holds its own national policies surrounding
indigenous rights such as the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act.95 Despite
the international and national policies, the Philippines has inconsistently
implemented indigenous protection policies. For example, in the Bukidon
region, the indigenous KADIMADC community stated a wealthy
landowner, who owns the largest gun-making factory in the country, was
illegally sub-leasing indigenous land for a Dole plantation without their

86.
SAUL, supra note 19, at 30.
87.
HANNA, supra note 73, at 149.
88.
Id.
89.
CHATURVEDI, supra note 11, at 54−55.
90.
Id. at 52−53.
91.
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide, Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro), Separate Opinion of Judge Weeramantry 647, https://www.icj
-cij.org/public/files/case-related/91/091-19960711-JUD-01-05EN.pdf (last visited
Apr. 27, 2021); CHATURVEDI, supra note 11, at 53−54.
92.
CHATURVEDI, supra note 11, at 53.
93.
Global Witness, supra note 59, at 20.
94.
UNDRIP, supra note 3.
95.
Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act (2017); see also Lynette Torres,
Indigenous Peoples in the Philippines: Perspective on Inclusion, Global Observatory
for Inclusion (June 15, 2016), http://www.globi-observatory.org/indigenous-peoples-in
-the-philippines-perspectives-on-inclusion/ (stating the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act
“affirms Indigenous Peoples’ rights to ancestral domains, self-governance and
empowerment, social justice and human rights, and rights to cultural identity); see
generally UNDRIP, supra note 3.
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consent.96 Dole failed to take steps in reviewing this land lease to
determine if the land was disputed and if the FPIC was granted.97 Because
of Dole’s lack of due diligence, the community’s indigenous peoples
turned to local government to investigate allegations.98 Reportedly, instead
of investigating, government officials tried to bribe indigenous members
to sign consent forms.99 The KADIMADC people remained on their land,
but the wealthy landowner’s security personnel in the area have threatened
the community with loss of homes and life.100 The Philippines government
is failing to implement the FPIC on a national and local level, and it has
failed to implement the UNDRIP policies it agreed to at an international
level.
The Ixquisis peoples’ struggles in Guatemala show another
example of indigenous groups fighting to overcome their country’s
conflicting regulations and right to develop.101 After the end of the
Guatemalan Civil War in 1996, the country opened itself to foreign
development to boost its economy.102 As a result, many projects began
developing, including the San Andrés and Pojom II dams.103 A large
funder of these dam projects is the Inter-American Development Bank,
which has received international criticism for investing in the project.104
The Ixquisis community alleges the dam projects have contaminated their
rivers, affecting their ability to fish, farm, and maintain cultural
traditions.105 An activist group, including indigenous leaders, criticized the
dam project due to the company’s failure to consult the indigenous
community.106 Despite Guatemala adopting UNDRIP, the government
allowed development without indigenous consultation.107 Due to lack of
consultation, multiple members of the indigenous activist movement, “the
Peaceful Resistance of the Ixquisis,” protested the hydroelectric dam
project on their land.108
96.
Global Witness, supra note 59, at 20.
97.
Id. at 21.
98.
Id. at 20.
99.
Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 23.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Anastasia Moloney, Inter-American Development Bank Should
Withdraw Guatemala Dam Funding: Rights Groups, REUTERS (Aug. 7, 2018),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-guatemala-dam-rights-idUSKBN1KS0NI.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Global Witness, supra note 59, at 25.
108. Id. at 23.
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This hydroelectric dam project—owned and operated by one of
the wealthiest families in Guatemala—has caused “a wave of forced and
violent evictions” of the Ixquisis people.109 Recently, Guatemalan police
have targeted the Peaceful Resistance of the Ixquisis because of their work
defending land rights.110 Sadly, the protests have led to even more Ixquisis
being injured and murdered.111 Because the political and economic clout
of the family who owns the dam project, the protesters are unable to seek
police help or support from their government.112 The government has
cancelled talks with indigenous leaders, which would have been led by
Guatemala’s human rights ombudsman.113 Case studies such as this, where
a country fails to enforce the FPIC at national and international levels,
appear all over the world.114 In order to improve implementation and
compliance, the international community must see the FPIC as binding law.

IV. THE FPIC AND THE PUSH TOWARD HARD LAW
International law evolves from a variety of places, such as treaties,
customary law, judicial decisions, or universal norms.115 First, this section
will address how laws become customary (“hard law”), while highlighting
that the FPIC is still only soft law. Second, this section will analyze how
a customary law is developed by tracing the steps of the hard law
principles “duty not to harm” and “right to home and property.” Third, it
will address what steps the UN and nation states can take to develop the
FPIC into new hard law. Finally, this paper will explore the FPIC’s
incorporation into already existing hard law, the international obligation
to preserve cultural resources.
A. Hard Law v. Soft Law
Customary law is defined as “the set of rules of state practice that
are consistently and uniformly followed by states based on a sense of legal
obligation.”116 Customary international law has three elements: (1) “state
109. Id.
110. Genevieve Belmaker, Latin America Saw Most Murdered
Environmental Defenders in 2018, MONGA BAY NEWS (Aug. 24, 2019), https://news.
mongabay.com/2019/08/latin-america-saw-most-murdered-environmental-defenders
-in-2018/.
111. Id.
112. Global Witness, supra note 59, at 23.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 8.
115. YANG, supra note 2, at 49−66.
116. Id. at 57.
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practice must be widespread and virtually uniform in conformance with
the rule;” (2) belief that the practice is “legally compelled” (opinio juris);
and (3) the act is taken by a significant number of states and not rejected
by a significant number of states.117 On the other hand, soft law is often
considered “not yet law.”118 Soft law may not be seen by nations as law
because it is not legally binding, it is not intended to be law, or it is
unenforceable law.119 Soft law may become customary international law
through a process called crystallization.120 Crystallization occurs through
judicial precedent frequently citing the principle, treaties, or voluntary
commitments, or a majority of nations making their actions toward a new
norm.121
The first element in forming customary international law is
nations’ widespread conformity to the practice.122 For example, ILO 169
is an international binding document on indigenous rights; however, only
20 countries have signed on.123 Clearly, only 20 signatories indicates a lack
of conformity to the principle. While a majority of countries have signed
onto UNDRIP,124 the state practice of implementing the principle is not
uniform. For instance, interpreting whether indigenous groups have veto
power creates significant ambiguity in the international community, and it
leads to inconsistencies with implementation.125 Even courts’ judicial
frameworks have been inconsistent, which creates issues with nations
uniformly executing the FPIC.126
The second element is a belief that the practice is legally
compelled.127 UNDRIP is a non-binding but “morally obligatory”
declaration of indigenous rights.128 In fact, experts argue the reason so
many nations signed on to UNDRIP was due to the nonbinding legal
117. Id.
118. Id. at 62.
119. Id. at 62−63.
120. Id.
121. Id.; see, e.g., Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay
(Argentina v. Uruguay) (Order on the Request for the Indication of Provision
Measures [2006] ICJ Rep 135 (2006), at para. 204 (holding that environmental impact
assessments are considered a customary international obligation because of a
consensus held among States that it is the new norm).
122. Id. at 57.
123. Hanna, supra note 73, at 147.
124. UNDRIP, supra note 3.
125. See supra Part III. A.
126. See, e.g., I/A Court H.R., Saramaka People v. Suriname, Judgement
of Nov. 28, 2007, Series C, No. 4 No. 172.; I/A Court H.R., Kichwa Indigenous People
of Sarayuku v. Equador, Judgement of June 27, 2012, Series C, No. 245.
127. YANG, supra note 2, at 57.
128. Making the Declaration Work, supra note 30, at 111.
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status, whereas only 20 nations signed onto ILO 169 because it is legally
binding.129 Both Canada and the United States, initially refusing to sign
UNDRIP, finally signed between 2009 and 2010—stating the declaration
does not reflect customary international law and does not change their
national laws.130 New Zealand expressed similar notions when it signed in
2010, stating UNDRIP “expresses new, and non-binding, aspirations.”131
Additionally, there is not enough legal compulsion through judicial
precedent to cause the FPIC to bind participating nations. Because the
FPIC is a relatively new concept, there are only a handful of relevant cases.
Saramaka People v. Suriname132 is important because it is the first
case that explored the FPIC and it revealed a number of issues that need
to be resolved in order for countries to effectively implement the FPIC.133
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, an autonomous tribunal
overseeing human rights’ violations in Central and South American
countries, ruled that indigenous tribes must be able to give consent to
safeguard their lands.134 The court referenced sections from UNDRIP,
particularly Article 32, stating “the State has a duty, not only to consult
with the Saramakas, but also to obtain their free, prior, and informed
consent, according to their customs and traditions.”135 The court, however,
declined to elaborate on whether consultation with the goals of the FPIC
in mind were enough, or if the FPIC created a stronger duty to obtain
consent.136 Unfortunately, even four years after the judgment, Suriname
still had not met the court’s order to demarcate the Saramaka’s land.137
In another landmark case, Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayuku
v. Equador,138 the court upheld the need for participation rights,
established in Suriname, and further elaborated that there is a duty to
consult based on the FPIC as well as a duty of consent for large scale
projects.139 In 2008, the African Commission on Human and People’s
Rights issued a court decision that cited principles from the InterAmerican Court on Human Rights stating “[f]ailure to . . . consult or to
seek consent . . . results in a violation.”140 Despite the recognition toward
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

HANNA, supra note 73, at 151.
Engle, supra note 28, at 145 n.9.
Id.
IACtHR. (ser. C) No.172 (2007).
ROMBOUTS, supra note 10, at 220.
Id. at 263.
Id. at 265 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 265.
Id. at 274.
IACtHR (ser. C) No. 245 (2012).
Id. at 287.
Id. at 305.
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other judicial precedent, the UN Special Rapporteur still “contended that
the form of [FPIC] implementation is context dependent and that there is
no ‘single formula.’”141 Many courts, such as the European Court of
Human Rights, which oversees numerous indigenous populations, still
have no jurisprudence on the FPIC.142 This indicates a significant number
of courts are not citing to the FPIC judicial precedent, which makes the
FPIC legally ineffective in most nations.
Finally, the third element of customary law requires that a
significant number of nations execute and not reject the FPIC, and that the
FPIC is not rejected by a significant number of nations.143 Here, a majority
of nations have adopted this principle with 144 original signatories in
2007—the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand later voicing
support.144 At least on paper, a significant portion of states support the FPIC.
However, signatory countries like the Philippines and Guatemala are still
failing to execute the principle successfully.145 While the FPIC may satisfy
the third element, there is no indication of widespread conformance or
belief that the FPIC is legally binding. Because the FPIC is still soft law,
it is important to compare with hard law principles like the duty to not
harm and right to home and property in order to analyze how it can become
customary law.
B. Hard Law Principles: Duty Not to Harm
and Right to Home and Property
The international community now see duty not to harm and right
to home and property as widespread, legally compelled, and adopted by
almost all nations. This indicates that nations view these two concepts as
hard law and binding.
Duty not to harm “recognize[s] state responsibility for
transboundary air pollution,” and created a duty on the polluting nation to
pay for any damages caused by their transboundary harm.146 In 1941,
during arbitration between the United States and Canada, a tribunal
decided Trail Smelter, a major case, which established the now customary
international law: the duty not to harm.147

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. at 318 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 219.
YANG, supra note 2, at 57.
UNDRIP, supra note 3.
See supra Part II. B.
YANG, supra note 2, at 58.
Id. at 611.
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In Trail Smelter, a private Canadian company’s smelter site
emitted sulphur dioxide into the atmosphere causing damage to United
States farms and citizens.148 The two countries brought the dispute to the
International Joint Commission, which awarded the United States
$350,000 in damages.149 The United States, unsatisfied, proposed
arbitration and Canada agreed.150 The Tribunal used the “‘general
principles of international law on State liability for cross-border
damages’” to establish the now recognized duty not to harm.151 Because
of this decision, the Trail Smelter case has become a norm in international
law with a case in the International Court of Justice, the Pulp Mills case,
continuing to recognize the transboundary harm rule put forth in Trail
Smelter.152
Additionally, the duty not to harm is memorialized in treaties and
other international instruments. For example, the Stockholm Declaration
expressed the duty not to harm in its Principle 21, which states that
“sovereign states may not allow their territory to be used to cause harm to
the environment of other states or the global commons.”153 The duty not
to harm developed quickly, but customary international law has been
judged as a “more or less subjective weighing of the evidence.”154 Nations
follow the duty not to harm rule because of its presence in international
judicial precedent, memorialization in treaties, and its general acceptance
among nation states.
Another example of a hard law principle is the right to home and
property. The United Nations initiated the right to home and property
principle under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). The
UDHR—created to prevent future atrocities seen during World War II—
states “[e]veryone has the right to own property.”155 While the UDHR is
not a binding document, “it is considered a codification of the underlying

148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. (internal citations omitted).
152. See, e.g., Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay
(Argentina v. Uruguay) (Order on the Request for the Indication of Provision
Measures [2006] ICJ Rep 135 (2006), at para. 204 (explaining the transboundary harm
rule applied when Argentina objected to Uruguay allowing development of two pulp
mills on their shared Uruguay River border because the court stated Argentina has an
obligation to respect other States’ environments)).
153. YANG, supra note 2, at 58.
154. Id. at 59 (internal citations omitted).
155. Universal Declaration of Human Rights (10 Dec. 1948), U.N.G.A.
Res. 217 A (III), Art. 17(1) (1948).
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substantive customary international law norms.”156 Agreements like the
American Convention on Human Rights further codify the right to
property and home through Article 21, which lays out a fundamental right
to property.157
Judicial proceedings also solidify the right to home and property
concept, such as in the European Court of Human Rights’ (“ECHR”)
Lopez Ostra v. Spain holding.158 This case set precedent when the ECHR
held severe environmental pollution constitutes a violation of right to
home and property, and therefore, a state violates the right to home if it
does not strike a fair balance between the severe pollution that caused the
harm and the economic interests.159 The international community
recognizes and extends the right to home and property through a number
of treaties and cases like Lopez Ostra. The international unity and support
behind this human rights’ principle indicates that the FPIC, focusing on
indigenous human rights, will be more successful once it is codified.
C. Making the FPIC Emerging Customary International Law
Ultimately, customary law “is an evolutionary process where
there is likely to be disagreement about its status . . . during the process of
its creation.”160 The mere fact that scholars still debate whether the FPIC
is customary international law shows that it is not yet hard law. The FPIC
is slowly becoming crystallized into hard law, yet, there is still ambiguity
about executing the principle among countries that have signed UNDRIP.
The FPIC may become customary international law by solidifying the first
two of the three customary law elements: (1) widespread conformity and
(2) belief the principle is legally binding.161
To establish widespread uniform practices, nations must address
issues with implementation. If states are not uniformly executing the FPIC,
then the first element of creating international customary law cannot be
satisfied.162 For instance, the governance gap, as previously mentioned,
could be resolved through looking at writings and suggestions from
156. YANG, supra note 2, at 364.
157. American Convention on Human Rights (San Jose, Costa Rica, 22
Nov. 1969), 9 I.L.M. 673, Art. 21 (1970), entered into force 18 July 1978 (stating
“everyone has the right to the use and enjoyment of his property. The law may
subordinate such use and enjoyment to the interest of society.”).
158. Lopez Ostra v. Spain, judgement of 9 December 1994, series A no.
303 para. 51.
159. YANG, supra note 2, at 381−83.
160. Id. at 60.
161. See supra Part III. A.
162. See supra Part IV. A.
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scholarly articles. The UN Food and Agriculture Organization has
produced guidelines on how to implement the FPIC.163 Also, the UN
Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner published a guide on
implementing frameworks involving human rights.164 The guidelines
suggest states should promote respect for human rights among their
commercial transactions.165 Additionally, the right to home and property
rule could be used as a building block to extend into indigenous rights.
Another important guideline to conformity is ensuring
governmental departments and agencies are providing support and
information to local branches of government.166 Adopting these principles
could allow countries to apply pressure on ICMM to change its guidelines,
and if not, force companies in their own countries to comply with more
stringent consent standards. By continuing to publish frameworks for the
FPIC, nations and leading scholars can begin to use these frameworks to
eventually satisfy the widespread conformity element in customary law.
The second element, belief the practice is legally binding,167 can
be satisfied through consistent legally-binding judicial decisions. By
issuing judicial decisions like the holding in Saramaka People v.
Suriname, the court “appeared to interpret elements of the UN Declaration
as having gained the status of international custom.”168 Additionally, the
court created a legal framework of five elements to implement valid
consultation: (1) consultation must be sufficient and prior to the
development plan; (2) the consultation goal must be to reach an agreement
in good faith; (3) consultation must be adequate and accessible in line with
the indigenous peoples’ decision-making models; (4) an environmental
impact assessment must be conducted adequately with participation of the
community; and (5) the consultation process must meet informational
requirements, which include constant communication.169 As the
international community has begun to see, court systems outside the InterAmerican Court on Human Rights have used this key framework. One
example is the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights.170

163.
164.

FAO, supra note 39.
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, UNITED NATIONS
HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER, https://www.ohchr.org/
documents/publications/guidingprinciplesbusinesshr_en.pdf (last visited Apr. 27,
2021).
165. Id. at 8.
166. Id. at 10.
167. YANG, supra note 2, at 57.
168. ROMBOUTS, supra note 10, at 298.
169. Id. at 291−93.
170. See supra Part III. A.

2020

FREE, PRIOR, AND INFORMED CONSENT

261

Ideally this will lead to consistent and set rules that nations, along with
international court systems, will look to as legally binding.
Educating signatory nation states on some of these suggestions
may help with developing national constitutions, and the UN can begin
promoting consistent key frameworks that legally bind nations.
Ultimately, the frameworks for the FPIC implementation will come
through other courts adopting the holdings from previous cases, as shown
in Trail Smelter. Potentially, the best way to speed the process of adopting
frameworks would be through a decision by the International Justice
Court—which is legally binding on all UN signatories171—that enshrines
the concepts the Inter-American Court on Human Rights laid out in
Saramaka. Another way to speed the process would be to recognize the
FPIC as an already established concept.
D. The FPIC Inclusion in Existing International Laws
Surrounding Cultural Resource Protection
United Nation’s Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(“UNESCO”), a specialized United Nation’s Agency, had five
conventions focusing on preserving cultural heritage.172 These five
conventions included: (1) the 1954 Hague Convention and its two
protocols; (2) the 1970 Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and
Preventing the Illegal Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership with
Cultural Property; (3) the World Heritage Convention; (4) Underwater
Cultural Heritage Convention; and (5) Intangible Cultural Heritage
Convention.173 The FPIC has the potential of becoming hard law through
incorporation into these already existing conventions protecting cultural
resources. In particular, two main conventions that form the customary
principle surrounding cultural resource protections could apply: (1) The
Hague Convention and (2) the World Heritage Convention.
In response to the “cultural atrocities perpetuated by Nazi
Germany during World War II,” a number of European countries proposed
protections through the Hague Convention, the first and oldest
international treaty protecting cultural resources.174 The 1954 Hague
171. How the Court Works, INT’L CT. OF J. (May 7, 2020), https://www.icj
-cij.org/en/how-the-court-works.
172. CRAIG FOREST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PROTECTION OF
CULTURAL HERITAGE 33 (2010).
173. Id.
174. U.S. Committee of the Blue Shield, U.S. Ratifies Treaty to Protect
Cultural Property in Time of War (Sept. 30, 2008), https://uscbs.org/news/us-ratifies
-treaty-to-protect-cultural-property-in-time-of-war/; see also Armed Conflict and
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Convention laid out measures to prevent destruction of cultural heritage
sites specifically during armed conflicts; however, the United States did
not ratify the Hague Convention until 2008.175 The Hague Convention
allows criminal prosecution for those who threaten cultural sites, including
“theft, pillage or misappropriation of, or acts of vandalism directed against
cultural property protected under the Convention.”176
World leaders recently recognized the significance of the Hague
Convention when former President Donald Trump threatened to bomb
Iranian cultural sites and was met with intense backlash from the
international community.177 United States Senator Tim Kaine stated, “The
pledge to attack cultural sites, likely, is a violation of international law,”
while the Metropolitan Museum of Art emphasized there is global
importance in protecting cultural resources that connect people with their
communities.178 The Hague Convention is legally binding on the 121
countries that have ratified it.179
Similarly, nations came together to protect natural heritage sites
through the World Heritage Convention.180 While the Hague Convention
covers cultural heritage in times of war, the World Heritage Convention
sought to address impacts such as industrialism, economic upheaval, and
climate change on heritage sites.181 The World Heritage Convention was
as much about protecting culture as it was about protecting the
environment.182 The World Heritage Convention has contributed to the
development of international customs, particularly in relation to ergo
Heritage: 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event
of Armed Conflict, United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization,
http://www.unesco.org/new/en/culture/themes/armed-conflict-and-heritage/
convention-and-protocols/1954-hague-convention/ (last visited Apr. 27, 2021).
175. U.S. Committee of the Blue Shield, supra note 174 (Due to the Cold
War the United States was reluctant to sign onto the 1954 Hague Convention first
protocol.).
176. Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection
of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict [Second Protocol], Art. 15 entered
into force 26 March 1999.
177. Lolita Baldor, Pentagon Rejects Trump’s Threat to Hit Iranian
Cultural Sites, ABC NEWS (Jan. 6, 2020), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/
wireStory/pentagon-rejects-trump-threat-hit-iranian-cultural-sites-68106602.
178. Id.
179. U.S. Committee of the Blue Shield, U.S. Ratifies Treaty to Protect
Cultural Property in Time of War (Sept. 30, 2008), https://uscbs.org/news/us-ratifies
-treaty-to-protect-cultural-property-in-time-of-war/.
180. World Heritage Convention [UNESCO] (Paris, 16 Nov. 1973) 3
U.N.T.S 4 entered into force 17 Dec. 1975.
181. FOREST, supra note 172, at 224.
182. Id.
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omnes, a concept that is considered an international law norm.183 Ergo
Omnes means “toward everyone.”184 The World Heritage Convention
captures the ergo omnes concept in its preamble, which recognizes the
duty of the international community to preserve heritage sites for the
benefit of all people.185
The Convention is also binding on its 186 signatories,186 but it
contains no legal consequences for destruction of listed sites.187 Instead,
signatories can benefit from grant funding, heritage site listings, and
assisting signatories with sites that are considered high risk for
degradation.188 Although the World Heritage Convention does not have
any specific language on settling disputes for breaching parties, a breach
of a customary concept, such as ergo omnes, could amount to an
“internationally wrongful act,” which could pressure nations toward
international enforcement.189
Because protecting cultural resources is tantamount to the
FPIC’s goals, the FPIC could easily be incorporated into established
cultural heritage protections that international law already recognizes as
binding. The World Heritage Convention’s Preamble aligns with the
FPIC’s vision. It states that “existing international conventions,
recommendations and resolutions concerning cultural and natural
property demonstrate the importance, for all the peoples of the world, of
safeguarding this unique and irreplaceable property, to whatever people
it may belong.”190 Indigenous communities seek to protect lands that are
considered unique and irreplaceable property. For instance, indigenous
lands are used for religious and traditional practices such as prayer,
rituals, festivals, and other cultural ceremonies. 191 Extending cultural
heritage to include indigenous lands is a natural progression.
Once the international community uniformly recognizes the FPIC
as part of this customary law, the UN and other non-breaching countries
can begin demanding that other countries follow the FPIC through
cessation, assurances, guarantees, and reparations.192 There may even be
183. Id. at 277.
184. YANG, supra note 2, at 58.
185. FOREST, supra note 172, at 277.
186. Id. at 228.
187. Id. at 278.
188. Id. at 267, 278.
189. Id. at 400–01. (For example, international enforcement could include
cessation or sanctions.).
190. World Heritage Convention, supra note 180, at Preamble.
191. SAUL, supra note 19, at 166.
192. See Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,
GAOR, 56th Session No. 10 U.N. Doc. A/56/10, Arts. 30–31(2001).
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potential for criminal charges against companies who “theft, pillage or
misappropriate” cultural resources or those that cause “extensive
destruction or appropriation of cultural property” protected under the
Hague Convention.193

V. CONCLUSION
While UNDRIP and the FPIC’s adoption is a big step in
internationally recognizing indigenous rights, it is still far from effective.
The FPIC’s historical development may help to strengthen the intentions
behind UNDRIP. The FPIC’s intentions will be further solidified if the
international community recognizes it as hard law, whether through a
newly recognized concept or one that is already established in customary
law. By recognizing the FPIC as binding hard law on the international
world, the issues such as lack of clarity in implementation and lack of
enforcement would be resolved because clearer frameworks would be
developed. The FPIC can only be effective if nations consider it binding
hard law.
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